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Dairy Farm Revenue Insurance: Is the Application Viable? 
 
Lowering the dairy price support throughout the 1980’s led to a market milk price 
that has been largely determined by market forces since the early 1990’s.  Consequently 
the base farm market milk price has varied much more than it had in the decades where 
the price support routinely interfered (Figure 1).  Recent World Trade Organization 
developments threaten to further erode formal US dairy policies which support and 
insulate farm milk prices.  In reaction to this, USDA has championed farm-level risk 
management tools such as a milk price options pilot program.   
In 2000 the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) authorized the 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000 to facilitate the provision of insurance on 
livestock, expanding insurance possibilities on farms to the livestock enterprise.  This led 
to the development of Livestock Revenue Protection (LRP) and the Livestock Gross 
Margin (LGM) by private sector entities under 508h provisions. These products are 
currently in pilot testing on a limited basis for cattle and pigs.  The LRP is an option 
contract based on an average of cash markets and is available for more months than 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) option contracts. The LGM is an option contract 
on gross margin which is based upon the CME for livestock futures prices and the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) for corn and soybean meal futures prices. 
Prior to the LRP and LGM, Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) insurance was 
initiated on a pilot basis in 1999 and expanded subsequently to several locations.  AGR is 
an insurance contract using expected accrual gross revenue for the farm as a basis for 
determining the insurance guarantee.  The application was restricted to livestock as a 
minor contributor to farm revenues. Subsequently, a private sector 508h contract called   2
AGR-Lite was initiated which permitted livestock as the principal enterprise in a farm 
business. Variations of AGR-Lite have been proposed that capture some of the gross 
margin themes that underlie the LGM contract.  This paper focuses on whether the 
current structure of AGR-Lite and variants that have been proposed meet the conditions 
for insurability as outlined by FCIC standards when applied to dairy operations.  
The analysis is based upon Michigan dairy farm cross-sectional panel data from 
1990 through 2004.  Dairy revenue component for each farm is calculated as a sum of 
milk revenue, dairy livestock revenue, patronage, and government payments pertaining to 
the dairy enterprise adjusted for inventory adjustments to make adjusted gross revenue.  
In addition, crop revenue and other revenue (determined as a residual value) are used in 
the analysis to determine the variability in gross cash farm income for dairy farms.  Milk 
price and milk yield per cow variability also are evaluated since the dairy enterprise is the 
primary source of revenue.  
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section briefly describes the mechanics of 
AGR, the data are described in the third section including a revenue variance 
decomposition, insurance feasibility criterion are discussed in the fourth section and 
evidence from the Michigan farm data are examined vis-à-vis these criteria, finally 
conclusions and implications for further work are discussed. 
AGR Revenue Insurance Contract 
Current livestock revenue insurance tools include AGR and AGR-Lite.  AGR 
insures the revenue of the entire farm by guaranteeing a percentage of average gross farm 
revenue, including a small amount of livestock revenue (USDA-RMA, 2003).  The plan 
uses information from a producer's 5-year historical farm average revenue as reported on   3
Schedule F tax forms, and the current year's expected farm revenue, to calculate the 
policy revenue guarantee (USDA-RMA, 2003).  AGR-Lite is similar to AGR.  Insurance 
is provided against revenue loss due to any unavoidable occurrence (USDA-RMA, 2006).   
  AGR protection is calculated by multiplying the expected
1 adjusted gross revenue 
by the coverage level and the payment rate (co-pay) selected by the producer (USDA-
RMA, 2003).  The coverage level determines where indemnity payments begin; 
indemnities are given by: 
 Indemnity = (coverage* expected AGR – realized AGR,0)*Payment rate.  
Payment rates determine how much the producer is paid for each dollar lost under the 
coverage level.  Coverage levels are 65, 75 and 80 percent while payment rates are 75 or 
90 percent.  Some restrictions apply to the number of commodities that must be produced 
for eligibility of higher coverage levels.   
Current AGR policies are based upon accrual farm revenue, rather than revenue 
per cow.  This raises difficult underwriting questions which are explored below, using the 
panel data, including how the expected farm revenue would be measured and the 
consequences of yield shortfalls.  One of the alternative measures of farm revenue that 
has been proposed as an insurance contract is milk revenue less feed purchases which 
better captures the impact of crop yield shortfalls on the farm on net farm income.   
Insurance Feasibility  
Assessing the feasibility of an insurance instrument requires understanding the peril and 
available instruments.  Three questions must be addressed. 
                                                 
1 USDA/RMA uses the term expected in a layperson parlance, not in a formal probabilistic manner.   4
What is the peril of concern? 
The perils covered in revenue insurance include any unavoidable natural 
occurrence (e.g., adverse weather, disease, fire).  Bad debts are treated as a form of 
negligence, not natural occurrences.  Dairy farms might be especially interested in perils 
that are related to milk and forage production (quantity and quality) as these do not have 
obvious other available risk management instruments. 
What are the risk characteristics of the peril? 
  This question is aimed at understanding the probability distribution of insured 
losses.  Sufficient data must be available to estimate the distributions in question and 
identify any characteristics which may aid in categorizing producers by degree of risk.  
This is the primary purpose of this paper. 
What risk mitigation or transfer mechanisms currently exist? 
Current risk mitigation mechanisms available to dairy operations include futures 
and options contracts to handle feed and milk price risk.  Additionally, forward contracts 
are available through many cooperatives and processors to help control for milk price 
risk.  In addition, current milk marketing order provisions blend prices across classes and 
the dairy price support program provides a floor price for manufactured uses of milk.  
Finally, cooperatives perform most of the raw milk marketing in the U.S. and as part of 
this marketing use contracts and other instruments to manage price risk. 
Insurability conditions 
Past research indicates a number of conditions that must be present to consider a peril 
insurable (Rejda, 2001; Shaik et al, 2006).  We consider each condition relative to dairy 
farm revenue.   5
Determinable and measurable loss 
   The contracts in question utilize Schedule F information which all producers 
must file as part of their income taxes.  Revenue, or revenue less feed purchases, can be 
measured from this information. 
Accidental and unintentional loss 
  This condition is meant to get at the potential for hidden action and monitoring 
moral hazard problems.  Deductibles, co-payments and audits are ways to deal with these 
problems.  Fraud on income taxes is subject to stiff penalties and audits are already 
performed by the IRS.  Thus, we might reasonably assume that reporting problems would 
be minimal.  The incentive to shirk managerial responsibility can be taken care of by the 
deductible. 
Sufficient information to conduct risk classification 
  Adverse selection, the possibility that only farms likely to have revenue failures 
will purchase insurance is another potential problem.  Which characteristics might aid in 
classifying farms, for example herd size, is one of the objectives of this research. 
Sufficient data to establish accurate premium rates 
  Data is required to set premium rates based on expected losses.  Insurers typically 
set premium rates inversely with the amount of data available.   
Losses sufficiently uncorrelated to allow for pooling 
  This factor is related to premium level, therefore, the more systemic the risk, the 
less that pooling across farms reduces the variability in annual losses for the overall 
insurer portfolio.  This relates to the level of reinsurance that will likely be required of 
RMA to transfer the systemic risk to the federal government.   6
Economically feasible premium 
  The final question is whether the premium will be at a level that farmers will be 
willing to pay.  This relates to the required premium, subsidies from the government, 
diversification and other risk management strategies available to the farmer. 
 
Dairy Farm Data and Summary Statistics 
The data utilized are from Michigan State University Department of Agricultural 
Economics Farm Business Analysis Summary reports.  Individual farm records are 
available from 1990 through 2004.  To assess specific AGR policy implications requires 
at least 5 years of data available to establish a producer’s historical farm average.  There 
were 141 operations with at least 5 years of data available for a total of 1167 farm-year 
observations, with average years of data available for the farms around 8 years.   
Cross-section summary statistics including mean, median, and standard deviation 
of size, production, price and revenue variables are presented in Table 1, which provide a 
description of the nature of the farms in the data set.  All data were detrended and prices 
deflated to 2004 values.  Within this cross-sectional data set the average herd size was 
196 cows which is larger than the typical average herd size in Michigan which is closer to 
120 cows in the time period considered.  The median herd size was 137 cows indicating a 
positively skewed distribution.   
Milk price averaged $14.19/cwt and milk per cow averaged 20,020 pounds.  
Adjusted gross revenue, calculated as gross revenue with accrual adjustments for change 
in inventories, averaged $618,645 with a large standard deviation and a large positive 
skewness.  Dairy revenue included milk sold as well as cull and dairy animal sales, coop   7
dividends, and government payments related to the dairy enterprise.  Other revenue is all 
other farm sales (excluding dairy sources of revenue). 
Dairy Farm Revenue Variability 
The objective of AGR is to partially mitigate the financial effects of significant revenue 
shortfalls.  Examining the major components of milk revenue assists in locating the 
drivers of variation.  To determine the cause of variation in dairy revenue factors we look 
at the variation in AGR, milk price, and milk per cow. 
The first measure explored is the relative variation of AGR and AGR less feed 
purchases.  The relative variation is calculated as the dollar value of AGR (AGR less feed 
purchases) divided by the predicted value of AGR (AGR less feed purchases).  The 
predicted value is based on the regression of AGR against time.  The estimate of relative 
variation was calculated for AGR and AGR less feed purchases for all farms as well as 3 
different herd sizes: 24-99 cows, 100-249 cows, and 250 or greater cows.  The results are 
presented in Charts 1-8.  The estimates are smaller than the out of sample results would 
be because they are constructed as if the true but unknown mean was known as well as 
overcompensation in trend short time-series. 
Reviewing Chart 1 and 2 for all farms it was determined that 5% of the cases were 
less than 79% coverage for AGR and 6% were less than 79% coverage for AGR less feed 
purchases.  These frequencies are much lower than for crop revenue insurance contracts, 
even after adjustments for in versus out of sample properties and comparable 
aggregations were taken into account.  
    8
The second measure looks at milk revenue variation through the coefficient of 
variation for milk price.  The average coefficient of variation for annual milk price 
without deflation across all farms and over years was 11 percent with a standard 
deviation of two percent.  However, with the milk price deflated to 2004 dollars, the 
coefficient of variation averaged 20.8 percent with a standard deviation of three percent.  
A kernel density was also calculated for the deflated milk price shown in Figure 2.  The 
crops for which revenue insurance contracts are facilitated by FCIC have coefficients of 
variation in the 18 to 22 percent range.  Thus, the dairy farms in this set exhibit sufficient 
milk price variation to be feasible insurance candidates.  It is important to note that 
options and futures contracts are currently available to handle this type of milk price risk. 
  The third measure, milk yield per cow, is much less variable than for crop farms 
with revenue insurance contracts, ranging from five to nine percent; that compares to 25 
to 40 percent for dryland crops.  Kernel densities of de-trended milk per cow (milk yield) 
indicate that 92% of all farms were within 3,000 pounds/cow of trend yield (and 84% 
were within 2,000 pounds) (Figure 3).  Size categories were examined for both the milk 
price and milk per cow kernel densities, but were not shown to be important in 
classifying farms for dairy revenue purposes. 
 
Revenue Variance Decomposition 
Variance decomposition was used to identify the source of variation in adjusted gross 
revenue and adjusted gross revenue less feed purchases.  Revenue was divided into two 
sources: dairy and other.  The farms examined derive the majority of their revenue from   9
the dairy enterprise.  On average these farms derived 90 percent of farm revenues from 
dairy related activities (and 82 percent of farm revenue was from milk sales).  
Variance was decomposed using the general relationship Var(X+Y) = Var(X) + 
Var(Y) + 2Cov(X,Y).  Table 2 presents the results of the revenue decomposition.  When 
divided into dairy and other revenue sources, dairy revenues contributed the largest 
source of variation.  The negative covariance between these two sources, dairy revenue 
and other revenue indicates that diversification contributes to less revenue variability.  
Similarly, when the insured revenue is defined as being net of feed purchases, the largest 
contributor to variation is dairy revenue and covariances between dairy revenue and other 
revenue is negative while the covariance between dairy revenue and feed purchases is 
positive, as well as the covariance between other revenue and feed purchases is positive.  
The relationship between the covariances is what was expected. 
The resultant variability in milk revenue per cow is less than that of crops, even 
irrigated crops.  One principal criterion for insurability is whether there is sufficient 
variation in the measure being insured to warrant a need for risk transfer, particular when 
the deductible structure required guarding against hidden action is taken into account.  
Revenue shortfalls would very seldom trigger an indemnity under the deductible 
structures used in insurance policies of these types.  
Policy interference: The MILC program 
The 2002 Farm Bill introduced deficiency payments on milk production for the first time.  
The Milk Income Loss Contract Program paid dairy farmers 45 percent of the difference 
between the Class I mover and $13.69/cwt from December 2001 through September 2005 
on milk production up to 2.4 million pounds annually (e.g., 120 cows producing 20,000   10
pounds each).  This program was very important in 2002 and 2003 with payments 
reaching $1.80/cwt in some months.   
  To account for MILC effects on farm revenue variation, we assumed that a 
producer would collect the average MILC payment on all eligible milk production (e.g., 
the greater of all milk production or 2.4 million pounds) but capped the amount at the 
reported level of farm government payments.  MILC payments made up an average of 3.5 
percent of gross farm revenue and 4.0 percent of dairy related revenue across farms from 
2002 through 2004.  
  Without MILC payments, revenue variation was larger.  The variance 
decomposition in Table 2 indicates that the MILC program off-sets dairy revenue 
variance under either insurance contract.  The MILC program was recently renewed for 
two years at a reduced 34 percent payment rate.  However, the presence of this or other 
similar programs clearly would affect the demand for revenue insurance. 
 
Conclusions 
One principal criterion for insurability is whether there is sufficient variation in 
the measure being insured to warrant a need for risk transfer, in particular when the 
deductible structure required guarding against hidden action is taken into account.  
Revenue shortfalls would trigger an indemnity under the deductible structures used in 
insurance policies of these types at a much lower frequency than for crops with revenue 
insurance and other AGR policies. 
Currently, AGR for dairy enterprises is available on a very limited basis.  The 
premium rate for the dairy enterprise in AGR was developed at a point in time when the   11
focus was on crops with the proviso that a limited component of farm revenues could 
come from livestock and poultry. The purpose was to not preclude farms from 
participating that had livestock as a minor enterprise. One of the underwriting issues was 
how one would separate out the impacts of a crop yield shortfall of a crop grown for both 
feed and sale; in the event of a crop yield shortfall, sales could go to zero as limited 
production would be diverted to use for feed.  Given that context and substantial 
uncertainties about implementation including issues of underwriting, treatment of price 
cycles for some classes of livestock and poultry, and very limited experience with a new 
federal dairy policy, premium rates were set with a substantial safety factor.  
The premium rate on the dairy enterprise was set at 9% of liability for 75% 
coverage.  A re-examination of this rate is appropriate given the consideration of farms 
under AGR-Lite where dairy can make up the major component of farm gross revenues 
and a larger consideration has been given to dealing with underwriting issues. 
  The next step, if a decision were made to go forward with an insurance contract 
program, is to assess other insurability conditions criteria including acceptable 
consequences of hidden information and hidden action, and acceptable transactions costs 
including monitoring.  Additionally, since this research was completed using an 
unbalanced panel, further insight will be needed on the consequences of an unbalanced 
panel when determining an insurance contract.   12
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  (cows)  (cwt)  ($/cwt)* (lb/cow)  ($)*  ($)* ($)* ($)* 
             
Mean  196 41,363 14.19  20,020  618,645 528,524 90,056  128,425 
Median 137 27,392 14.06  20,079  396,109 349,353 32,138  73,682 
St.Dev. 242  52,930 1.75  4,296 1,056,592 679,494  717,870  200,143 
*All values in 2004 dollars 
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Table 2. Farm Revenue Variance Decomposition
2 























































                                                 
2   Variance Decomposition equation:   Var(dr+or-fp)=dr+or+fp+2Cov(dr,or)-2Cov(dr,fp)-2Cov(or,fp)  , 
where:  dr=dairy revenue, or=other revenue, fp=feed purchases 
 
   15
 
 














































































































Chart 4:   Relative Variation: Adjusted Gross Revenue less feed purchases:  24-99 cows 

































































































































































Chart 8:   Relative Variation: Adjusted Gross Revenue less feed purchases: 250 + cows 
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Figure 3:  Kernel density of detrended milk per cow 
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